A corruption game with two simultaneous actors under strategic uncertainty
Corruption is known for its harmful impacts on the welfare of an economy, as it creates huge societal losses. Experimental methods provide a helpful tool to understand incentives against corruption and to evaluate potential policies to avoid corruption. Many bribery experiments were conducted with different purposes (e.g. effects of whistleblowing, ethics, norms and culture, different active actors, ways of punishment or auditing). In all these experiments bribe offers are introduced in a sequential way. Thus, our study contributes to the existing literature by introducing a simultaneous bribery game. This scenario is relevant, because most of the time more than one person can initiate a bribe. The goal is to evaluate if there is a difference in results between the simultaneous and the sequential version of the corruption game.
The presentation by Alexander Schnabl will be held in German.
Co-authors Siegfried Eisenberg (WU Wien), Ben Greiner (WU Wien), Martin Hulényi (Institute for Strategy and Analysis, Government Office of the Slovak Republic)
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