The Efficiency of Patent Litigation
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Abstract
How efficient is the U.S. patent litigation system? Estimating a novel dynamic model, we characterize the litigation system’s role in shaping innovation. In our model, heterogeneous firms innovate and may sue each other for patent infringement. In equilibrium, expected future litigation activity impacts firm innovation incentives. Moreover, some firms create positive innovation externalities while others impose negative externalities. Litigation reform can, therefore, improve or harm welfare, depending on how heterogeneous firms endogenously select into lawsuits. Estimating the model, we evaluate historical and recently proposed litigation reforms. Defendant-friendly reforms promote innovation and boost economic growth, improving welfare by up to 3.29%.
Speaker
Toni Whited is the Frederick G L Huetwell Professor and Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan. She received her B.A. in economics and French, summa cum laude, from the University of Oregon in 1984 and her Ph.D. in economics from Princeton in 1990, working with Ben Bernanke. Professor Whited taught in a wide variety of areas in finance, macroeconomics, and econometrics at the undergraduate, MBA, and doctoral levels. She has published over 40 articles in top-tier economics and finance journals. Her research covers topics such as the effects of financial frictions on corporate investment, econometric solutions for measurement error, corporate cash policy, structural estimation of dynamic models, monetary policy, and corporate diversification. She has won a Jensen Prize for one of the top articles in corporate finance in the Journal of Financial Economics and twice won a Brattle Prize for one of the top articles in the Journal of Finance in corporate finance. She is the past-president of the Western Finance Association, and she serves as editor-in-chief for the Journal of Financial Economics.