Political Culture of Society under the Conditions of Radical Social Changes. A Comparative Analysis of Poland and Ukraine

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Abstract

This paper is devoted to the comparative study of political culture in the two post-communist countries Poland and Ukraine, which are in different stages in the transformation from communist to democratic society. Our analysis is based on data sets provided by the New Democracies Barometer III (1993) and IV (1995). Political culture is defined as a system of orientations toward politics. The evaluative component of such aspects of political culture as regime orientation, external competence and political trust is taken into consideration. Our comparison shows that in Poland the evaluation of external competence is more positive than in Ukraine. The population of Ukraine distrusts the political institutions more than the population of Poland. In Ukraine a substantial part of the population feels nostalgia for communist times, and this nostalgia has a tendency to increase. In Poland on the other hand the majority of population evaluates the communist regime negatively. The structure of the relations between the economic and political orientations is mainly the same in both countries under study. Differences in relations presented in the model have a tendency to decrease. The direction in which Ukraine is heading is similar to that of Poland.

Keywords
Political Culture, Post-Communist Transition, LISREL Model
Andriy Gorbachyk is Professor of Sociology at the Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University, Ukraine, and presented this paper during his stay at our Institute on June 26, 1997.

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Political Culture in Poland and Ukraine. Theoretical Background

The triumph of democracy in Eastern and Central Europe seems to be obvious now. The «cold» war is finished, Germany has been united and the Soviet Union has fallen to pieces. Communism and instability in Europe seem to be in the past. But there are substantial reasons to take issue with such an optimistic judgement. Some of the post-communist countries were more successful in establishing a market economy and the transformation to democratic society. Among them are the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. These countries have good chances for achieving a stable democracy. But in such European countries as Ukraine and Belarus the success of transformation to a market economy and democracy is problematic.

The political culture of the society is one of the crucial factors for the survival and stability of democracy. «A study of mass political behaviour would certainly be relevant to policymaking...» (Verba 1980:409). Consequently, «...societies in Central and Eastern Europe urgently need scientific data to help show where they are and the direction in which they are heading» (Rose, Haerpfer 1996:5).

Here, we analyse the complex phenomenon of political culture, which includes a variety of orientations toward politics. «There is little or no agreement on the definitions and theories of, methods for and paradigms of political culture» (Gibbins 1989:2). In our analysis we follow the classical definitions of political culture, which were proposed in the 1960s. These are:

Almond and Verba (1963:13) define political culture as «specifically political orientations — attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system ... It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes».

According to Herbert McClosky (Rosenbaum 1975:6) political culture must be limited to the «attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to the political process and provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour».

Almond and Powell elaborate the concept of political culture in three directions: (1) substantive content; (2) varieties of orientations (cognitive, affective, and evaluative) and (3) the systemic relations among these components (Almond 1980:27). The first dimension can be interpreted as «system culture», «process culture» and «policy culture». «System culture» includes attitudes toward the national community, regime, and authorities. «Process culture» means attitudes toward the self in politics (parochial-subject-participant) and attitudes toward other political actors (trust, co-operative competence, hostility). «Policy culture» is a distribution of
preferences regarding the outputs and outcomes of politics, the ordering of such values as welfare, security and liberty.

Rosenbaum (1975:6-7) proposes three core elements of political culture: orientations toward governmental structures, orientations toward others in the political system and orientations toward one’s own political activity.

Orientations toward governmental structures include regime orientation (how an individual evaluates and responds to the basic governmental institutions of his society, its symbols, officials and norms) and orientations toward governmental inputs and outputs (how individuals feel and respond). Orientations toward others in the political system include political identifications (the political units, geographic areas and groups to which one feels he or she belongs); political trust (the extent to which one feels an open co-operative, or tolerant attitude in working with others in civic life); «rules of the game» (an individual’s conception of what rules should be followed in civic life). Orientations toward one’s own political activity include political competence (how often and in what manner a person participates in civic life) and political efficacy (the feeling that individual political action can have an impact on political process).

Following these definitions described above we define political culture as a system of orientations towards politics. We consider the evaluative component of political orientations and analyse the following aspects of political culture:

1. **Regime orientation** under conditions of radical social change. As indicators of the regime orientation we use preferences for (a) the economic regime (socialist, current, future); (b) the political regime (communist, current, future) and the value regime orientation (preferences for the communist rule, the rule by the army, the choice between a strong leader or the parliament).

2. **Orientations toward others in the political system.** Here, we consider confidence (trust) in political institutions.

3. Orientations toward one’s own political activity. We are comparing political efficacy (evaluating the political system and the government as open and responsive to the citizen’s demands).

4. The relations between regime orientation (economic, political, value), the confidence in political institutions, and the social-economic characteristics of the respondent.
The main aim of our research is to construct a model which explains the main relations between core political orientations and to undertake a comparison of these relations for different countries in different periods of time.

The «level» of orientations (absolute values of the corresponding indicators) depicts different «types» of political culture. For the problem under study we hypothesise that in different post-communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe in different periods of transformation intensity, the direction and character of the orientations described will differ substantially. This can be explained by different types of political culture. For example, those with more authoritarian tendencies will more likely reject a democratic regime in each country during all periods of transformation because the regime orientation is always dependent upon authoritarianism in the same way. However, we also examine the structure of relations between countries to see if they are the same between different countries and different years.

In this paper, we analyse and compare the different orientations and relations between them in two post-communist countries of Eastern Europe — Poland and Ukraine — in 1993 and in 1995.

First of all, let us consider general differences between these two countries.

Communist societies with similar formal institutional features differed in the development of oppositional politics and the stability of regimes (Evans, Whitefield 1993:533). The specific historical experience of nations implies fundamental beliefs and values, identification, loyalty, political expectations. In Russia, Ukraine and Belarus orthodoxy, autocracy and nationalism explained the high level of fit between the mentality of the population and the communist regime. In contrast the Catholic traditions of Poland opposed such a fit.

Moreover, the historical features of communist political regimes in Poland and Ukraine were not the same. According to Kitschelt different models of transformation can be explained by the different character of communism in different post-communist countries. Ukraine experienced *patrimonial communism* while Poland experienced *national communism or communism of national consensus* (Kitschelt 1995:4-5).

Patrimonial communism appeared in agrarian authoritarian countries in the period between the wars. The educated middle class was formed only later during the communist regime. The society existed with the help of repression. Democratic transformation was supported by part of the political elite, which stressed the importance of personality. In post-patrimonial countries the old elite is likely to rule. Opposition to the Communist Party is weak.

National communism appeared in societies where the middle class was formed before World War 2 (before the communist regime). It resulted in some pluralism even during the communist
regime. The Catholic church was the base of the opposition forces in Poland. At the end of the 1980s an agreement on the transformation to liberal democracy took place. In such circumstances opposition is much better organised, and the communist forces are not so strong.

While comparing political cultures of Poland and Ukraine we have to take into account one more historical factor. Ukraine has become an independent state only since 1991. It was necessary to create a state with all of its appendages in addition to the process of transformation to a new system. There was no previous experience of independent state rule, and there were no established connections with other states which were not members of the USSR. Because of these difficulties there is a threat of integration with Russia.

The population of the former Soviet Union (Ukraine is not an exception) suffer because of the economic crisis. This leads to a negative evaluation of the current economic and political regime. In Ukraine, the economic achievements in Russia lead to people looking with more favour at this country. Russian speaking people in the former Soviet Union are more educated and adapt to the market more easily. The Russian language was the language for communication of all the populations of the USSR and this factor may ease the process of integration with Russia for Ukraine. The creation of territorial borders seems unnatural. Problems connected with ethnic conflict, controversial territories, like the situation in Crimea, or the disagreement over the division of the Black Sea fleet between Russia and Ukraine could be solved by integration.

However, the revival of a union with Russia is a threat for democracy in Ukraine. Whilst in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe which have not belonged to the former USSR in the past the majority of the population is conscious of the «Russian threat», a substantial part of the population of countries which were former members of the USSR support integration with Russia. According to sociological surveys in Ukraine there exist three major orientations: post-soviet, European, and national (Potekhyn, Parakhonska 1997:55). Post-soviet orientations include uniting with other countries — former members of the USSR — and the development of connections with Russia. In 1994 62% of the Ukrainian population supported a post-soviet orientation, in 1995 50%, and in 1996 41%. The post-soviet orientation has a tendency to decrease, but it is still substantial.

As a result of these differences between the two countries under study, they differ in the degree of democratisation. The Freedom House scale of civil liberties and political freedom not only takes into account competitive elections but also civil liberties and the freedom of association needed to make electoral competition effective. According to the Freedom House scale, Poland today is free, while Ukraine is only partly free (Rose, Haerpfer 1996:11-13). At the same time we have to note that both Poland and Ukraine have achieved a higher level of freedom than a decade ago.
It is clear that the current situations in Poland and Ukraine differ extensively. In Ukraine nostalgia for communist times is much stronger than in Poland. The success of the market in Ukraine is at much lower level than in Poland. Opposition to communist forces in Ukraine is still weak and in addition, in Ukraine a substantial post-soviet orientation exists. But obviously there are a lot of similarities like the existence of a common communist past and common Slavonic roots. Taking into account the differences and similarities of these two societies we compare political cultures under conditions of radical social transformation from communism to democracy.

**Research Strategy and Hypotheses**

As we noted earlier our research is mainly aimed at:

1. a comparison of the defined elements of political culture for Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995;

2. an examination of relations between such constructs as regime orientations (economic, political, value) and the confidence in political institutions;

3. a comparison of these relations for Poland and Ukraine;

4. an examination of changes in Poland and Ukraine during the period from 1993 to 1995.

These aims indicate particular methodologies of research. First of all, we are analysing cross-national survey data. It gives us an opportunity «to take account of cross-national differences and inconsistencies that could never be uncovered in single-nation research ... cross-national research provides an especially useful method for generating, testing and further development of sociological theory» (Kohn, 1987:77).

Macrocomparative analysis of changes requires a *structural equation models* approach to the analysis of sociological information. Core elements of structural equation models are (Goldberger 1973:1) using *hypothetical constructs* or latent variables which, while not directly observed, have operational implications for relationships among observable variables and the consideration of relations in the *system*: the models can be built up of several or many equations which interact together. Moreover, the consideration of the same constructs and same relations in multi-group models means that we can be sure of studying the same phenomena for both Poland and Ukraine.

The structural equation approach gives us an opportunity to consider complex concepts such as regime orientations, confidence in democratic institutions, whilst ensuring that we are
measuring the same concepts for both countries. For these purposes we constructed four-groups measurement models (Joreskog, Sorbom, 1993:51): Poland 1993, Ukraine 1993, Poland 1995, Ukraine 1995. In order to compare factor loadings for the two countries in different periods of time we consider completely standardised solutions within groups. On the basis of factor score regressions of restricted solutions (models with equal factor loadings in four groups) we are able to measure the concepts in which we are interested. Such an approach ensures that we are studying the same phenomena for Poland and Ukraine in both periods of time.

We can compare systems of relations between mentioned concepts on the basis of regression models. We test whether a regression equation is the same in several samples (Joreskog, Sorbom, 1993:61-65). For all the relations presented in our final model we test the equality of regressions on the basis of differences between chi-square for unrestricted solutions and chi-square for a model with one or more constrained parameters.

Initially, we put forward several different hypothesis about the structure of relations between the concepts under study. That is why we used alternative models or competing models rather than a model testing approach. As a goodness-of-fit measure for our models we use the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) (Joreskog, Sorbom, 1993:115,125).

**Political Alienation**

According to Almond the model of a successful democracy requires that «all citizens be involved and active in politics and that their participation be informed, analytic and rational» (Almond 1980:16). The involvement of citizens in politics constitutes the substantive content of political culture. Political alienation is explained by a feeling of political inefficacy (powerlessness) and distrust (normlessness) (Gabriel 1995:357).

The concept of political efficacy was introduced into empirical research by Campbell, Gurin and Miller (Gabriel 1995:359) in 1954 with the following definition:

«Sense of political efficacy may be defined as a feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e. that it is worth while to perform one’s civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change».

Such a definition corresponds to Almond and Verba’s concept of subjective political competence. Almond and Verba (1963:215) divide political competence according to administrative and subject political competence. In the sense of subject competence:
“As competent citizens they [individuals] perceive themselves as able to affect governmental decisions through political influence».

Later Lane divided political competence according to internal (competence) and external (responsiveness). Internal competence is defined as self-image as a competent political actor. We earlier defined the notion of «political efficacy» or external competence as the perception and evaluation of the political system and the government as being open and responsive to the citizen’s demands.

Table 1. External competence (evaluation of the current political system and government as open and responsive to people demands)

(The table shows percentages of those, who agreed or disagreed with the following statements about the current system)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Our system by comparison with the communist is better in the following respects:</th>
<th>POLAND - 1993</th>
<th>UKRAINE - 1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>The Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone is treated equally and fairly by the government</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People can influence the government</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of interest in politics</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of joining organisations</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People can travel and live wherever they want</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People can live without fear of unlawful arrest</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of practising religion</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone is free to say what he or she thinks</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the table above we can conclude that in comparison with the communist system, the current one is seen as being much better in such aspects as freedom of interest in politics, freedom to join organisations, freedom of practising religion, and freedom to say what one thinks for both countries. For Poland we can also add freedom to travel (for Ukraine there is now less freedom to travel because of new borders between the countries of the former USSR) and no fear of unlawful arrest. However, for the possibility to influence government and fair, equal treatment by the government (the core elements of external competence) the current system is regarded as mainly the same as the communist one in both countries. Summarising

* For the wording of questions used in the analysis see Appendix A.
these result one can conclude that now there are a lot of «freedoms» in Poland and Ukraine, but these «freedoms» are not seen as providing an opportunity to influence the government.

Discussions of the political trust began with the work of Easton, who in 1979 proposed the concept of “political support” (Gabriel 1995:360). Political support is defined as a set of positive attitudes to political objects. Support can be specific and diffuse depending upon whether it applies to objects or content. Political trust is a form of diffuse support with regard to both the political regime and the incumbent political authorities. However, a further development is provided by Bertsch, Clark, and Wood (1995:58) who argue that political culture is allegiant if the majority of citizens trust the political system and the political elite and political culture is alienated if the majority of citizens distrust the political system and the political elite.

By comparing the valid percentage of trustful and distrustful population for Poland and Ukraine we can see which of these political cultures is more allegiant or alienated. We analysed the top level of power structures (government, president, parliament), the structures of force (military, courts, police), civil servants as an instrument of political powers and infrastructure of the democratic polity (political parties, media).

According to the table below both political cultures in Poland and Ukraine are alienated on the same level in the sense of attitudes to parties. As for other institutions, the Polish political culture is substantially less alienated than the Ukrainian one. This is particularly the case with regard to structures (military, courts, police): in Poland the attitude to police and army of the majority of citizens is trustful, while for Ukraine it is distrustful. While for the top level of power (parliament, government, president) the majority of the population in both countries is distrustful, in Ukraine the percentage of distrustful population substantially exceeds that of Poland. As for the differences in time, we can conclude that less and less people remain distrustful in both countries.
Table 2. Comparison of the valid percentage of the trustful and distrustful population for Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995

(The table shows percentages of those who trust or distrust the political structures of the country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How great is your personal trust in ...</th>
<th>POLAND - 93</th>
<th>UKRAINE-93</th>
<th>POLAND -95</th>
<th>UKRAINE-95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1 . parties</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 . courts</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 . police</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4 . civil servants</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5 . government</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6 . military</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7 . media</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C8 . parliament</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C9 . president</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to analyse the causes of alienation (in the sense of non-confidence in political institutions) we constructed a four-group measurement model of the concept «Confidence in democratic institutions» for Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995. The path diagrams for the four-group measurement models are shown in Appendix B.
### Table 3. Measurement model of the concept «Confidence in democratic institutions»

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How great is your personal trust in</th>
<th>factor loading within group completely standardised solution</th>
<th>factor loading common matrix</th>
<th>factor score regressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 ... parties</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 ... courts</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 ... police</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4 ... civil servants</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5 ... government</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6 ... military</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7 ... media</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C8 ... parliament</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C9 ... president</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RMSEA=.034

The value of the concept «confidence in democratic institutions» depicts the level of «trust»: a high value for the concept means «high trust». On the basis of the within-group completely standardised solution, one can conclude that the concept under study does not differ both between countries and in time.

According to Easton:

«For the regime ... trust would reveal itself as symbolic satisfaction with the processes by which a country is run» (Gabriel 1995:361).

This symbolic satisfaction we analyse on the base of regime orientation in Poland and Ukraine in the next section.
Regime orientation

As we noted earlier we consider regime orientation to have three dimensions: economic, political and value. The evaluation of the political and economic regimes in the NDB data set is relative. People evaluate:

«the past Communist regime, which everyone had experienced for almost all their life; the fledging new democracy; and then the regime five years from now, when few can be certain what it will be but everyone can hope — or fear» (Rose, Haerpfer 1996:18).

The evaluation of the economic regime can be used to estimate people's attitudes to a market economy and a socialist economy.

Table 4. Comparison of the valid percentage of those approving or disapproving economic regimes in Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995

(The table shows percentages of those who approve or disapprove of the past, present, and future economic regimes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POLAND - 93</th>
<th>UKRAINE - 93</th>
<th>POLAND - 95</th>
<th>UKRAINE - 95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>posit.</td>
<td>negat.</td>
<td>posit.</td>
<td>negat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>Socialist economy rating</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>Current economy rating</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>Economy in 5 years rating</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to this table the Ukrainian population positively evaluates the socialist economy and negatively evaluates the current and future economy whereas Poles prefer the current and future economy to the communist one. During the period from 1993 to 1995 Ukrainian's evaluations of the communist economy become more positive and of the future economic regimes more negative, whilst the current economy rating remains approximately the same. Poles in 1995 evaluate the current and future economy more positively than in 1993, while the socialist economy is evaluated more negatively.

Tendencies of increasing estimation of the current and future regimes in Poland and of decreasing estimation of the future economic regime in Ukraine also correspond with the subjective evaluation of the family economic situation.
Table 5. Comparison of the valid percentage of the estimation of the family economic situation in Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995.

(The table shows percentages of those who regard past, present, and future family economic situations as good (better), bad (worse))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POLAND-93</th>
<th>UKRAINE-93</th>
<th>POLAND-95</th>
<th>UKRAINE-95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>good</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>Current economic situation</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>Economic situation 5 years ago</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>Economic situation in 5 years</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 shows that in 1993 the evaluation of the current economic situation in Poland and Ukraine is approximately the same, but in 1995 Ukrainians estimated their family economic situations to be worse than in 1993, whilst Poles feel it to have become better. The same tendency can be observed for the evaluation of the family economic situation five years in the future: in 1993 it is approximately the same for Poland and Ukraine, but in 1995 it has become higher for Poland and lower for Ukraine. As for the evaluation of the family economic situation five years ago in Ukraine, it is much higher than in Poland for both 1993 and 1995, but the tendency is similar both in Poland and in Ukraine: less and less people estimate their past economic situation as being better than the current one.

The tendencies for the socialist economy rating (positive rating in Ukraine, negative rating in Poland; increasing level of positive rating in Ukraine, decreasing in Poland) remains the same as for the communist political regime rating.

The estimation of the current political system (positive in Poland, negative in Ukraine) grew in 1995 for Poland in comparison with 1993, but in Ukraine it remains approximately the same. The political system in 5 years is estimated more positively in Poland than in Ukraine, although for both countries the positive evaluation of the future political system is increasing.
Table 6. Comparison of the valid percentage of the approval or disapproval of the political regimes in Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995.

(The table shows percentages of those who approve or disapprove of the past, present, and future political regimes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POLAND - 93</th>
<th>UKRAINE-93</th>
<th>POLAND -95</th>
<th>UKRAINE-95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>posit.</td>
<td>negat.</td>
<td>posit.</td>
<td>negat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1 Communist political system scale</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2 Current political system scale</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3 Political system in 5 years</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the previous three tables we can assume that increasing economic difficulties on the micro-level (the family economic situation) in Ukraine lead to a more negative evaluation of both the economic and the political regime than in Poland.

In order to estimate the systemic relations between constructs of the economy and political regime orientation and the evaluation of the family economic situation we constructed four-group measurement models. The path diagrams for the four-group measurement models are shown in Appendix C.

Table 7. Measurement model of the concept «Evaluation of family economic situation»

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>factor loading within group completely standardised solution</th>
<th>factor loading common matrix</th>
<th>factor score regressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland 93</td>
<td>Ukraine 93</td>
<td>Poland 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1 Current family economic situation</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2 Economic family situation 5 years ago</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3 Economic family situation in 5 years</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RMSEA=.025
Table 8. Measurement model of the concept «Economic regime orientation»

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>factor loading within group completely standardised solution</th>
<th>factor loading common matrix</th>
<th>factor score regressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1 Socialist economy rating</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2 Current economy rating</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 Economy in 5 years rating</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RMSEA=0.0

Table 9. Measurement model of the concept «Political regime orientation»

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>factor loading within group completely standardised solution</th>
<th>factor loading common matrix</th>
<th>factor score regressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1 Communist political system scale</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2 Current political system scale</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3 Political system in 5 years</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RMSEA=.014

The tables 7-9 show that the concepts taken into consideration do not differ substantially for Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995. High values for the concepts «family economic
situation», «economic regime orientation» and «political regime orientation» result in a positive evaluation of the current and future family economic situation, and of the current and future economic and political regimes.

Another related issue is value regime orientation, which is supposed to be more democratically oriented in Poland than in Ukraine.

Following Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995:30) we understand values as:

«desirability in matters of action — taking action in its wider sense to cover evaluations, judgements, decisions and the like». Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995:32) conceptualise values on the basis of three propositions:

1. Values cannot be directly observed.
2. Values engage moral considerations.
3. Values are the conceptions of the desirable.

Values are regarded as «underlying orientations which are relevant for, or inform the process of, arriving at attitudes».

As measures of the construct «value regime orientation» we use four variables, three of them (about the army, communist rule and strong leader) according to Rose constitute an authoritarianism scale or identify an «authoritarianism syndrome» (Rose, Haerpfer 1996:20).

**Table 10. Comparison of the valid percentage of the value political regime orientation in Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995**

(The table shows percentages of those who agree or disagree with different political regimes)
According to the table above one can conclude that in Ukraine nostalgia for the communist regime is greater than in Poland. Moreover, in Ukraine there is a tendency towards increasing nostalgia for Communist times, while in Poland this decreases. As to the preference for a military regime this does not differ much for Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995: in Ukraine this regime is seen a little more favourably. The majority of the population of Poland in 1993 disagrees with the statement «A strong leader is better than Parliament». On the contrary, the majority of the Ukrainian population agrees with this statement. In 1995 this tendency became still stronger. In Ukraine more people favour the approval of Parliament suspension in 1995 than in 1993 while in Poland it remains the same. The path diagrams for the four-group measurement models «Value regime orientation» are shown in Appendix D.

Table 11. Measurement model of the concept «Value regime orientation».

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>factor loading within group completely standardised solution</th>
<th>factor loading</th>
<th>factor score regressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V1</td>
<td>We should return to Communist rule</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2</td>
<td>Army should govern...</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V3</td>
<td>Strong Leader better than Parliament</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>Approval of Parliament Suspension</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Restricted model: RMSEA=.029.

The concept «value regime orientation» measures levels of the support for the democratic order. The within group completely standardised solution shows that the concept under study does not differ substantially for Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995.
Relations between the Regime Orientation and Confidence in Political Institutions

Our regression model is aimed at finding the causes for the elements of successful democracy such as positive democratic regime orientation and confidence in democratic institutions.

According to Richard Rose and William T.E. Mishler (1996:44) there are:

1. _Political Legacy of Communism_. If people react against the communist regime, they are more likely to reject authoritarian alternatives (in our definition «political value orientation»).

2. _Political Performance of the Current Regime_. If people are positive about the new regime, they are more likely to reject authoritarian alternatives.

3. _Micro-economic influences_. If a family’s own economic situation has deteriorated, a person is more likely to endorse authoritarian alternatives.

4. _Macro-economic influences_. If people of disapprove systemic changes in the economy, they are more likely to endorse authoritarian alternatives.

5. _Social Structure_. If people are located in more ‘modern’ parts of the social structure (e.g. more educated, younger, urban or secular), they are more likely to reject authoritarian alternatives.

6. _National Traditions, culture matter_. Differences in national culture influence how individuals respond to authoritarian alternatives.

7. Evaluations of the economic performance have strong effects on individual trust.

Taking into account both these assumptions and our understanding of values «as underlying orientations which are relevant for, or inform the process of, arriving at attitudes» (Van Deth, Scarbrough 1995:32), we hypothesise that there is the influence of value regime orientation on the evaluation of the current, past, and future political regime. The appropriateness of this influence was confirmed by analysing alternative models.

The analysis of alternative models resulted in the next four-group regression model.
Four-group regression model of the regime orientation and confidence in democratic institutions (within group standardised solution)

**POLAND - 1993**

- **Education**: 0.28
- **Economic regime**: 0.46
- **Value regime orientation**: 0.88
- **Political regime**: 0.74
- **Confidence in democratic institutions**: 0.87

**UKRAINE - 1993**

- **Education**: 0.20
- **Economic regime**: 0.23
- **Value regime orientation**: 0.97
- **Political regime**: 0.92
- **Confidence in democratic institutions**: 0.97

**POLAND - 1995**

- **Education**: 0.18
- **Economic regime**: 0.97
- **Value regime orientation**: 0.95
- **Political regime**: 0.05
- **Confidence in democratic institutions**: 0.93
According to the regression model the «value regime» is effected by education (social structure influence) and «economic regime orientation». The «family economic situation» indirectly influences (through «economic regime») «value regime orientation». «Political regime orientation» is directly effected by the «economic regime», «value regime» and indirectly (through the «economy regime») effected by the «family economic situation». The «family economic situation» and «political regime» influence «confidence in democratic institutions».

In the process of our models construction we used two socio-demographic variables: age and education. We found that age had no significant influence on all concepts and relations studied in our model. That is why in the final model we have only included education.

In order to estimate the differences in relations between education, the family economic situation, the regime orientation and confidence in political institutions we tested the equality of regressions (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993:61-65).
Table 12. Testing the equality of regressions in the regression model «Regime orientation and Confidence in Democratic Institutions»

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations</th>
<th>Unrestricted solution</th>
<th>Testing equality of regressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93 95 93 95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education -&gt; Value regime orientation</td>
<td>.28 .18 .20 .21</td>
<td>Chi-square= 5.49, df=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Family economic situation -&gt; Economy regime orientation</td>
<td>.34 .22 .17 .35</td>
<td>Chi-square= 157.61, df=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy Regime orientation -&gt; Value regime orientation</td>
<td>.21 .19 .02 .14</td>
<td>Chi-square= 5.87, df=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value regime orientation -&gt; Political Regime orientation</td>
<td>.13 0.0 .16 .19</td>
<td>Chi-square= 68.41, df=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy Regime orientation -&gt; Political Regime orientation</td>
<td>.46 .97 .23 .61</td>
<td>Chi-square= 223.29, df=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Family Economic Situation -&gt; Confidence in Democratic Institutions</td>
<td>.12 .16 .05 .07</td>
<td>Chi-square= 7.18, df=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regime orientation -&gt; Confidence in Democratic Institutions</td>
<td>.31 .17 .17 .23</td>
<td>Chi-square= 18.19, df=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the table above the three paths presented in our model do not show significant differences either in time or between countries. These paths are: influences of education on «value regime orientation», «economic regime orientation» on «value regime orientation» and «evaluation of the family economic situation» on the «confidence in democratic institutions». As we noted earlier, education was included in the analysis as the control variable. The final model demonstrates that education had significantly positive influence on the «value regime orientation» and this influence is stable. The influence of the «economic regime» on «value regime orientation» and the influence of the «family economic situation» on the «confidence in democratic institutions» are also positive, the same for both countries under study and stable in time.
The influence of the «evaluation of the family economic situation» on the «economic regime» differs substantially for Poland and Ukraine in 1993 (chi-square 72.36 with df=1). The significant difference for this relation also exists for Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995 (chi-square 64.47 with df=1). However, for Poland and Ukraine in 1995 and for Poland in 1993 there are no such differences (chi squares consequently 5.80 and 3.51 with df=1). Taking into account chi-square statistics and the path diagrams presented above, one can conclude that the influence of the «family economic situation» on «economic regime orientation» is not substantial for Ukrainians in 1993, but this relation changes in time and by 1995 it becomes more similar to the same relation in Poland. In 1993 the influence of the "family economic situation" on the "economic regime" was significantly less in Ukraine than in Poland. It was connected with substantial subjective expectations for changes in the economy that were not based on the real economic situation at that time. People then believed that it was possible to overcome the decline of the economy rather quickly and were tolerant about their own economic problems, but their expectations were not strictly based on the real development of the economy. In 1995 the expectations of people became more realistic: they understood that it is not so easy to transform the economy and they began to connect their own economic situation with the economy's transformation in the country. In Poland the influence of the household economic situation on economic regime orientation was already observed in 1993 and it did not change in 1995. By 1995, this was the case in Ukraine, too.

As for the influence of «value regime orientation» on «political regime orientation», it shows the opposite tendency. It does not differ for Ukraine and Poland 1993 and for Ukraine in time (chi-squares consequently 0.0 and 3.73 with df=1). But in Poland this relation has a tendency to decrease (chi-square for Poland 1993-1995 15.11 with df=1). In 1995 for Ukraine the influence of «value regime orientation» is still substantial while in Poland it is on a very low level (chi-square for Poland and Ukraine 1995 25.53 with df=1). We have to stress that we consider «value regime orientation» mostly according to the authoritarianism scale. For Ukraine authoritarianism remains substantial still in 1995, while in Poland the influence of this value is not so dramatic.

The path from the «economic regime» to the «political regime» is the most substantial presented in the model. One can conclude that economic regime orientation is a crucial factor in political regime orientation. It differs both in time and between countries. (Chi-squares for Ukraine and Poland 1993 13.82, 1995 158.13, for Ukraine 1993-1995 26.37, for Poland 1993-1995 13.17 with df=1). We have to note this influence has a tendency to increase in both countries. In 1993 in Ukraine this influence was rather small when the processes of transformation in the spheres of economy and politics developed separately, but in 1995 Ukrainians better understood the connection between economical success and political transformation.
The influence of «political regime orientation» on the «confidence in democratic institutions» decreases in time in Poland (chi-square 12.62 with df=1). In Ukraine it remains mainly the same (chi-square 5.43 with df=1). It does not differ substantially in the two countries under study both in 1993 and 1995 (chi-squares consequently 2.82 and 0.51 with df=1).

Finally, the model demonstrates that the structure of the relations between economic and political orientations is mainly the same in both of the countries under study. The differences in relations presented in the model have a tendency to decrease. The direction in which Ukraine is heading is similar to that of Poland.

Conclusions

The political culture of a society is a crucial factor for the survival and stability of democracy. It can be defined as a system of orientations toward politics. We have analysed the evaluative components of political culture and the systemic relations between them in two post-communist countries of Eastern Europe: Poland and Ukraine. The two countries under consideration are in different stages of the transformation to democracy. The comparison of political orientations and systemic relations between them for Poland and Ukraine gives us an opportunity to estimate the differences and similarities in tendencies in the transformation to a democratic society for two post-communist countries.

The main findings of our research are:

1. The analysis of external competence shows that the current political system in comparison with the communist one in both Poland and Ukraine is much better in such aspects as freedom of interest in politics, freedom of joining organisations, freedom of practising religion, and freedom to say what a person thinks. For Poland we can add freedom of travelling and no fear of unlawful arrest. But as to the possibility to influence government and fair, equal treatment by the government (the core elements of external competence) according to the opinions of the population the current system remains mainly the same as the communist one in both countries.

2. The comparison of political confidence shows that in Ukraine the percentage of distrustful people substantially exceeds that for Poland. But the percentage of distrustful people is declining with time in both countries.

3. The analysis of regime orientations shows that in Ukraine a substantial part of the population feels nostalgia for communist times and this nostalgia has a tendency to increase. On the contrary, in Poland, the majority of population evaluates the communist
regime negatively (in both economical and political aspects) and this evaluation became more and more negative.

4. According to the final regression model «value regime» (the authoritarianism scale) is effected by education and «economy regime orientation» (evaluation of the socialist, current, and future economy). The «family economic situation» (evaluation of the past, current, and future family economic situation) indirectly influences (through the «economy regime») «value regime orientation». «Political regime orientation» (evaluation of the communist, current, and future political regime) is directly effected by the «economy regime», «value regime» and indirectly (through the «economy regime») effected by the «family economic situation». The «family economic situation» and «political regime» influence the «confidence in democratic institutions» (evaluation of the level of trust in different political institutions).

5. The influences of education on «value regime orientation», of «economy regime orientation» on «value regime orientation» and of the «evaluation of the family economic situation» on the «confidence in democratic institutions» remains the same for Poland and Ukraine in 1993 and in 1995.

6. The influence of the «family economic situation» on the «economic regime orientation» is not substantial for Ukrainians in 1993, but this relation changes in time and by 1995 it has become similar to the same relation in Poland. As for the influence of «value regime orientation» on «political regime orientation», it shows the opposite tendency. It does not differ for Ukraine and Poland in 1993 and for Ukraine in time. But in Poland this relation has a tendency to decrease.

7. Economic regime orientation is a crucial factor in political regime orientation. It differs both in time and between countries. We have to note that this influence has a tendency to increase in both countries.

The main conclusion therefore is that although there are important differences between the political cultures of the two countries when we look at the aggregated statistics, in fact the underlying latent structure of orientation as measured by our LISREL model is the same between the two countries. Furthermore, it appears that in many respects the differences in relations presented in the model between Ukraine and Poland actually decreased between 1993 and 1995. Therefore, we could assume that Ukraine is heading in the same direction as Poland in the transformation process.
References


Appendix A. Wording of questions used in the analysis

Please think of the difference between the old system of government under the Communists. I will read out a series of statements on this card. Please tell me for each point whether you think our present political system by comparison with the Communist is fundamentally better (1), somewhat better (2), equal (3), somewhat worse (4), fundamentally worse (5)?

EC1. Everybody is treated equally and fairly by the government.
EC2. Ordinary people can influence what the government does.
EC3. Each person can decide whether or not to take an interest in politics.
EC4. People can join any organisation they want.
EC5. People can travel and live wherever they want.
EC6. People can live without fear of unlawful arrest.
EC7. Everybody is free to decide whether or not to practice a religion.
EC8. Everybody is free to say what he or she thinks.

There are many different institutions in this country, for example the government, courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this scale how great is your personal trust in each of these institutions that I read to you:

1 have no trust
7 have great trust

C1. Parties
C1. Courts
C3. Police
C4. Civil servants
C5. Government of the day
C6. Military
C7. Media, such as television and press
C8. Parliament
C9. President of this country

E1. Where on this scale would you put the socialist economy before the revolution of 1989?
ATTENTION: Include plus OR minus sign ________

-100..-90..-80..-70..-60..-50..-40..-30..-20..-10..0..10..20..30..40..50..60..70..80..90..100
E2. Where on this scale would you put our present economic system?
E3. Where on this scale would you put our economic system in five years time?

F1. As far as your family is concerned, all in all how do you rate the economic situation of your family today

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfactory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfactory</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very satisfactory</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unsatisfactory</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F2. When you compare your overall household economic situation with that of five years ago, would you say that in the past it was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little better</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little worse</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot worse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F3. What do you think the economic situation of your household will be in five year's time?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little better</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little worse</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot worse</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here is a scale for ranking how the government works. The top, plus 100, is the best; at the bottom, minus 100, is the worst.

P1. Where on this scale would you put the former communist regime?

P2. Where on this scale would you put our present system of governing with free elections and many parties?

P3. Where on this scale would you put our system of governing in five year's time?
Our present system of government is not the only one that this country has had. Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think?

I will read out a series of statements on this card. Please tell me for each point whether you strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3) or strongly disagree (4)

V1. We should return to Communist rule.

V2. The army should govern the country.

V3. It is best to get rid of Parliament and elections and to have a strong leader who can quickly decide things.

V4. If Parliament was suspended and parties abolished, would you approve or disapprove

| Strongly approve | 1 |
| Somewhat approve | 2 |
| Somewhat disapprove | 3 |
| Strongly disapprove | 4 |
Appendix B.

Four-group measurement model of confidence in political institutions, within group completely standardised solution.

POLAND - 1993

UKRAINE - 1993

POLAND - 1995
UKRAINE - 1995

CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Parties
Courts
Police
Civil servants
Government
Military
Media
Parliament
President

RMSEA=0.034.
Appendix C.

Four-group measurement models «family economic situation», «economic regime orientation», «political regime orientation», within group completely standardised solutions

## POLAND - 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAMILY ECONOMIC SITUATION</th>
<th>ECONOMIC REGIME ORIENTATION</th>
<th>POLITICAL REGIME ORIENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current economic situation</td>
<td>Economic situation 5 years ago</td>
<td>Economic situation in 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Current economic situation | Economic situation 5 years ago | Economic situation in 5 years | Socialisteconomy rating | Current economy rating | Economy in 5 years rating | Communist political system scale | Current political system scale | Political system in 5 years scale |
| .23                       | .91                         | .85                         | .97                     | .20                    | .39                         | .96                         | .24 | .28 |

## UKRAINE - 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAMILY ECONOMIC SITUATION</th>
<th>ECONOMIC REGIME ORIENTATION</th>
<th>POLITICAL REGIME ORIENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current economic situation</td>
<td>Economic situation 5 years ago</td>
<td>Economic situation in 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Current economic situation | Economic situation 5 years ago | Economic situation in 5 years | Socialisteconomy rating | Current economy rating | Economy in 5 years rating | Communist political system scale | Current political system scale | Political system in 5 years scale |
| .43                       | .83                         | .84                         | 1.00                    | .88                    | .96                         | .97                         | .64 | .87 |
POLAND - 1995

FAMILY ECONOMIC SITUATION
- Current economic situation
- Economic situation 5 years ago
- Economic situation in 5 years

ECONOMIC REGIME ORIENTATION
- Socialist economy rating
- Current economy rating
- Economy in 5 years rating

POLITICAL REGIME ORIENTATION
- Communist political system scale
- Current political system scale
- Political system in 5 years scale

UKRAINE - 1995

FAMILY ECONOMIC SITUATION
- Current economic situation
- Economic situation 5 years ago
- Economic situation in 5 years

ECONOMIC REGIME ORIENTATION
- Socialist economy rating
- Current economy rating
- Economy in 5 years rating

POLITICAL REGIME ORIENTATION
- Communist political system scale
- Current political system scale
- Political system in 5 years scale

RMSEA = .025
RMSEA = 0.0
RMSEA = .014
Appendix D.

Four-group measurement model «value regime orientation», within group completely standardised solution

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{POLAND - 1993} & \quad \text{UKRAINE - 1993} \\
\text{VALUE REGIME ORIENTATION} & \quad \text{VALUE REGIME ORIENTATION} \\
\text{we should return to communist rule} & \quad \text{we should return to communist rule} \\
.61 & \quad .53 \\
\text{army should govern} & \quad \text{army should govern} \\
.62 & \quad .64 \\
\text{strong leader better than parliament} & \quad \text{strong leader better than parliament} \\
.72 & \quad .74 \\
\text{approval of parliament suspension} & \quad \text{approval of parliament suspension} \\
\text{we should return to communist rule} & \quad .72 \\
.62 & \quad .72 \\
\text{army should govern} & \quad .64 \\
.62 & \quad .64 \\
\text{strong leader better than parliament} & \quad .74 \\
.72 & \quad .74 \\
\text{approval of parliament suspension} & \quad .94 \\
.72 & \quad .94 \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{POLAND - 1993} & \quad \text{UKRAINE - 1993} \\
\text{VALUE REGIME ORIENTATION} & \quad \text{VALUE REGIME ORIENTATION} \\
\text{we should return to communist rule} & \quad \text{we should return to communist rule} \\
.64 & \quad .45 \\
\text{army should govern} & \quad \text{army should govern} \\
.68 & \quad .53 \\
\text{strong leader better than parliament} & \quad \text{strong leader better than parliament} \\
.49 & \quad .53 \\
\text{approval of parliament suspension} & \quad \text{approval of parliament suspension} \\
\text{we should return to communist rule} & \quad .72 \\
.60 & \quad .80 \\
\text{army should govern} & \quad .72 \\
.53 & \quad .72 \\
\text{strong leader better than parliament} & \quad .74 \\
.76 & \quad .74 \\
\text{approval of parliament suspension} & \quad .95 \\
.22 & \quad .22 \\
.95 & \quad .95 \\
\end{align*}
\]

RMSEA = .029