Von:                                            IHS Library

Gesendet:                                Donnerstag, 25. März 2021 09:41

An:                                              Kerstin Merkel

Betreff:                                     WG: ZEW Discussion Papers

 

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Economics of Innovation and Industrial Dynamics

 

NO. 2 1 - 0 1 8 | 0 2 / 2 0 2 1

 

The COVID-19 Insolvency Gap:

First-Round Effects of Policy Responses on SMEs

// JULIAN DÖRR, SIMONA MURMANN, AND GEORG LICHT

 

Abstract

COVID-19 placed a special role to fiscal policy in rescuing companies short of liquidity from insolvency. In the first months of the crisis, SMEs as the backbone of Europe's real economy benefited from large and mainly indiscriminate aid measures. Avoiding business failures in a whatever it takes fashion contrasts, however, with the cleansing mechanism of economic crises: a mechanism which forces unviable firms out of the market, thereby reallocating resources efficiently. By focusing on firms' pre-crisis financial standing, we estimate the extent to which the policy response induced an insolvency gap and analyze whether the gap is characterized by firms which had already struggled before the pandemic. With the policy measures being focused on smaller firms, we also examine whether this insolvency gap differs with respect to firm size. Based on credit rating and insolvency data for the near universe of actively rated German firms, our results suggest that the policy response to COVID-19 has triggered a backlog of insolvencies in Germany that is particularly pronounced among financially weak, small firms, having potential long term implications on economic recovery.

 

Keywords: COVID-19 policy response, Corporate bankruptcy, Cleansing effect, SMEs

JEL: C83, G33, H12, O38

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21018.pdf

 


NO. 2 1 - 0 2 0 | 0 2 / 2 0 2 1

How Does the Evolution of R&D Tax Incentives Schemes Impact Their Effectiveness?

Evidence From a Meta-Analysis

// FLORENCE BLANDINIÈRES AND DANIELA STEINBRENNER

 

Abstract

A growing interest in R&D tax incentive policies has given rise to a large number of evaluations, which provide contrasting results about their effectiveness. Our meta-analysis aims to explain the heterogeneity found in the R&D tax incentive evaluations by the features of tax incentives. We document that on average R&D tax incentives stimulate R&D expenditures across two streams of empirical studies. However, this averaged effect is moderated by the underpinning features of tax incentives. Our samples evidence that the estimations linked to incremental bases and related to targeted rules towards SMEs drive the positive results found in the literature. Introducing a cap or a pre-approval process does not decrease the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives, allowing governments to monitor the indirect support needed to stimulate private R&D expenditures. Our results highlight the importance of setting up a clear and stable tax incentives framework. Sources of uncertainty regarding the timespan, the amount of the financial returns from tax claims but also the main criteria to apply are likely to decrease their effectiveness in the short run.

 

Keywords Meta-analysis - R&D tax incentives incentives

JEL codes C08 - O32 - H25 - O38

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21020.pdf

 


NO. 2 1 - 0 2 1 | 0 3 / 2 0 2 1

Disambiguation by Namesake Risk Assessment

// THORSTEN DOHERR

 

Abstract

Most bibliometric databases only provide names as the handle to their careers leading to the issue of namesakes. We introduce a universal method to assess the risk of linking documents of different individuals sharing the same name with the goal of collecting the documents into personalized clusters. A theoretical setup for the probability of drawing a namesake depending on the number of namesakes in the population and the size of the observed unit replaces the need for training datasets, thereby avoiding a namesake bias caused by the inherent underestimation of namesakes in training/benchmark data. A Poisson model based on a master sample of unambiguously identified individuals estimates the main component, the number of namesakes for any given name. To implement the algorithm, we reduce the complexity in the data by resolving similarity in properties. At the core of the implementation is a mechanism returning the unit size of the intersected mutual properties linking two documents. Because of the high computational demands of this mechanism, it is a necessity to discuss means to optimize the procedure.

 

Keywords: homonymy, namesakes, disambiguation, scientific careers, inventors, patents, publications

JEL: C18, C36

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21021.pdf

 


Corporate Taxation and Public Finance

 

NO. 2 1 - 0 1 9 | 0 2 / 2 0 2 1

 

Reporting Behavior and Transparency in European

Banks’ Country-by-Country Reports

// VERENA K. DUTT, KATHARINA NICOLAY, AND CHRISTOPH SPENGEL

 

Abstract:

The public CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions leaves leeway to the reporting firms as regards the calculating and presentation of the data. Based on a sample of CbCRs published by EU-headquartered multinational bank groups, we analyze the reporting behavior and the degree of transparency across the reports. We observe a large heterogeneity with respect to the place of publication of the CbCR, its content, the readability of the data tables as well as the list of entities that should be published together with the by-country data. We also identify differences between headquarter countries, with CbCRs prepared by bank groups from the United Kingdom and Germany being the most transparent. Inconsistencies in reporting inhibit the interpretability and the comparability of the data. We conclude that the specification of the underlying data source and of the applicable consolidation scope as well the establishment of uniform definitions of the reportable items are essential for an appropriate consideration of the reports by all addressees. Our analyses are particularly important in light of the proposal for a public CbCR for large multinational firms in the EU.

 

JEL Classification: H25, H26, G21, G28

Keywords: Country-by-Country Reporting; Financial Institutions; Public Disclosure; Reporting Behavior; Tax Transparency

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21019.pdf

 


NO. 2 1 - 0 2 2 | 0 3 / 2 0 2 1

Taxes and Business Philanthropy in Armenia

// ZAREH ASATRYAN AND DAVID JOULFAIAN

 

Abstract

The majority of countries around the world provide tax incentives for business philanthropy. However, little is known about the responsiveness of businesses to this tax treatment. This paper expands on this scant literature by focusing on the Armenian tax system which provides incentives for business philanthropy. The support takes the form of a deduction capped at a fraction of business receipts. This generates a kink beyond which the marginal tax subsidy drops to zero. Using administrative panel data for the years 2007 through 2017, we find strong evidence of bunching by Armenian firms at the kink, with a sizeable tax elasticity of giving at the intensive margin. The evidence on bunching is robust to whether firms have been audited, and to whether any tax deficiencies are observed. This suggests that the observed response is likely to be real rather than being driven by reporting responses.

 

Keywords: Business philanthropy, charitable giving, corporate income taxes, firm behavior, bunching, tax-price elasticity.

JEL codes: H25, H32, M14.

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21022.pdf

 


NO. 2 1 - 0 2 4 | 0 3 / 2 0 2 1

Collaborative Tax Evasion in the Provision of Services to Consumers –

a Field Experiment

// ANNABELLE DOERR AND SARAH NECKER

 

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment with sellers of home-improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we request an invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market which allows anyone to sell anonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track of credentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled. The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legal demand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting.

 

Keywords: Collaborative tax evasion, evasion discount, undeclared work, third-party reporting, field experiment

JEL Codes: H26; C93; E26; J22; O17

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21024.pdf

 


NO. 2 1 - 0 2 5 | 0 3 / 2 0 2 1

Monetary Incentives and the Contagion of Unethical Behavior

// BENOÎT LE MAUX, DAVID MASCLET, AND SARAH NECKER

 

Abstract

We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others’ behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can either truthfully report the number they see or lie about it in order to increase their payoff. We vary both the size of the payoff (Low, High, and Very High) and the amount of information about others’ dishonesty (With and Without Information). We first find that dishonesty falls in the Very High treatment. Second, while social information has on average at most a weak positive effect, there is a strong effect if the accuracy of individuals’ beliefs is accounted for. Third, social information and payoffs do not interact with each other.

 

JEL-Classification: C91, D03, D78.

Keywords: Laboratory experiment, theory, cheating, monetary incentives, information on others’ behavior, lying costs.

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21025.pdf

 


Social Policy and Redistribution 

 

NO. 2 1 - 0 2 3 | 0 3 / 2 0 2 1

 

Gender Diversity in Corporate Boards:

Evidence From Quota-Implied Discontinuities

// OLGA KUZMINA AND VALENTINA MELENTYEVA

 

Abstract

Using data across European corporate boards, we investigate the effects of quota-induced female representation on firm value and operations, under minimal identification assumptions. We consider sharp increases in the share of women on boards that arise due to rounding whenever percentage-based regulation applies to a small group of people. We find that having more women on corporate boards has large positive effects on Tobin`s Q and buy-and-hold returns. This result is in stark contrast with previous empirical work that finds large negative effects. The reason for this discrepancy is that these papers considered firms with different pre-quota shares of women to be good counterfactuals to each other. In our data, we see that such firms had grown differently already before the regulation. Thus, assuming they are good comparables would result in a negatively biased estimate of the effect. Instead, we use quasi-random assignment induced by rounding and find that promoting gender equality is aligned with shareholder interests. This positive effect is not explained by increased risk-taking or changes in board composition, but rather by scaling down inefficient operations and empire-“demolishing”.

 

Keywords: Gender diversity, women on boards, gender quota, performance

JEL codes: J16, G34, G38, D22

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21023.pdf

 


NO. 2 1 - 0 2 6 | 0 3 / 2 0 2 1

Welfare Effects of Property Taxation

// MAX LÖFFLER AND SEBASTIAN SIEGLOCH

 

Abstract

We analyze the welfare implications of property taxation. Using a sufficient statistics approach, we show that the tax incidence depends on how housing prices, labor and other types of incomes as well as public goods respond to property tax changes. Empirically, we exploit the German institutional setting with 5,200 municipal tax reforms for identification. We find that higher taxes are fully passed on to rental prices after three years. The pass-through is lower when housing supply is inelastic. Combining reduced form estimates with our theoretical framework, we simulate the welfare effects of property taxes and show that they are regressive.

 

Keywords: property taxation, welfare, tax incidence, local labor markets, rental housing

JEL Codes: H22, H41, H71, R13, R31, R38

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21026.pdf

 


Environmental and Resource Economics, Environmental Management

 

NO. 2 1 - 0 2 7 | 0 3 / 2 0 2 1

 

What Drives Carbon Emissions in German Manufacturing:

Scale, Technique or Composition?

// ELISA ROTTNER AND KATHRINE VON GRAEVENITZ

 

Abstract

Carbon emissions from German manufacturing have increased over the past decade, while carbon intensity (emissions per Euro of gross output) has declined only slightly. We decompose changes in emissions between 2005 and 2017 into scale, composition (changes in the mix of goods produced) and technology (emission factors of production) effects. We find evidence that the production composition in the German manufacturing sector is increasingly shifting towards less carbon-intensive products. However, we also find evidence to suggest that the energy intensity of production has increased. These results are largely driven by a few energy intensive sectors.

 

Keywords: Carbon emissions, Climate Policy, Statistical Decomposition, Manufacturing

JEL-Classification: D22, L60, Q41, Q48

 

Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp21027.pdf

 


 


 


ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim
L7, 1 · 68161 Mannheim | Sitz der Gesellschaft: Mannheim · Amtsgericht Mannheim HRB 6554 | Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender: Ministerialdirektor Ulrich Steinbach | Geschäftsführer: Prof. Achim Wambach, Ph.D.; Thomas Kohl

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
L7, 1 · 68161 Mannheim, Germany | Registered Office: Mannheim · Local Court Mannheim HRB 6554 | Chairman of the Supervisory Board: Ministerial Director Ulrich Steinbach | Executive Directors: Prof. Achim Wambach, PhD; Thomas Kohl

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ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim 

L7, 1 · 68161 Mannheim | Sitz der Gesellschaft: Mannheim · Amtsgericht Mannheim HRB 6554 | Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender: Ministerialdirektor Ulrich Steinbach | Geschäftsführer: Prof. Achim Wambach, Ph.D.; Thomas Kohl

 

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

L7, 1 · 68161 Mannheim, Germany | Registered Office: Mannheim · Local Court Mannheim HRB 6554 | Chairman of the Supervisory Board: Ministerial Director Ulrich Steinbach | Executive Directors: Prof. Achim Wambach, PhD; Thomas Kohl