VJE Seminar: Bauke Visser (Univ. Rotterdam)
Reputation Management and Assessment in the Lab
Bauke Visser (Erasmus Univ. Rotterdam)
In a reputation game, reputation-concerned agents use decisions and accompanying statements to influence assessments of their competence, and evaluators take such attempts into account when assessing them. We test the theoretical implications in the lab by comparing treatments with and without reputation concerns, and with and without statements. We find that statements become less informative due to reputation concerns, and that decision makers distort the decision less if they can use statements to influence assessments. On the other hand, the assessments of evaluators become less responsive to decisions and statements if decision makers care about their reputations, and evaluators react more to the decision in the absence of statements than in their presence. We use various methods to establish whether evaluators are good at assessing decision makers even if the latter attempt to influence their perception. We find that evaluators assess decision makers quite well, but they overly react to infrequent statements and are too tough on decision makers if they only observe decisions.
jointly with Sander Renes